Why Ongoing Developments in Ontario Slip-and-Exit Cases Have Limited Impact in Saskatchewan
Ongoing developments and inconsistencies in Ontario decisions involving slips occurring shortly after exiting a motor vehicle have generated discussion among insurers, counsel, and adjusters. These cases—often focused on the fine line between “disembarking” and encountering a separate ground hazard—can appear, at first glance, to signal a broader expansion of automobile accident coverage. In Saskatchewan, however, their practical significance is limited.
The reason is straightforward. Saskatchewan courts are not bound by Ontario tribunal or trial-level decisions, and more importantly, Saskatchewan now has a clear and controlling appellate framework that sharply focuses the analysis on causation. The governing question is not whether an injury occurred near a vehicle in time or space, but whether the injury was truly caused by the use of the vehicle itself. Where the vehicle is merely the setting for a ground hazard, Ontario reasoning cannot displace Saskatchewan authority.
The Ontario cases considered in this article are:
- Daphna Webb v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 ONFSCDRS 45
- Cannito v. Madison Properties Inc., 2018 ONSC 6190
- Racey v The Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 CanLII 2764
Saskatchewan’s Appellate Framework Controls the Analysis
Saskatchewan’s approach is now firmly anchored in recent appellate law. In Umpherville v Saskatchewan Government Insurance, 2025 SKCA 69, the Court of Appeal confirmed that establishing coverage requires more than a loose factual association between a claimant and a vehicle. At para 56, the Court articulated the governing framework:
(a) Did the accident result from an ordinary and well-known use to which motor vehicles are put?
(b) Is there a direct or consequential causal relationship, one that is more than merely incidental or fortuitous, between the claimant’s injuries and the use of a motor vehicle?
Applying that framework, the Court emphasized the centrality of causation. Mere presence in or around a vehicle is not enough. As the Court stated at para 59:
The motor vehicle was the situs of the injuries, but its use was not a cause of them under the modified Amos test. The connection is too tenuous. Mr. Sasakamoose’s mere presence in the vehicle is not sufficient to establish the necessary causal connection.
This language places a significant constraint on attempts to rely on out-of-province authorities where the vehicle did no more than provide the location from which the claimant encountered an independent hazard. That is why Ontario decisions, while potentially persuasive in some factual scenarios, have only limited effect in Saskatchewan.
Ontario Slip-and-Exit Cases Point in Different Directions
Importantly, Ontario authorities do not articulate a single, unified approach.
The most claimant-friendly decision is Webb v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 ONFSCDRS 45. In that case, the arbitrator concluded that the claimant was still in the process of disembarking when she fell. The decision stated:
“Disembarking from a motor vehicle is a normal activity required by the use or operation of a motor vehicle… I find as a fact that within a few seconds of exiting her car, Ms. Webb was still in the process of disembarking when she fell on the roadway before she was able to reach the safety of the sidewalk.”
The arbitrator further characterized the roadway hazard as secondary to the compelled nature of the exit:
“I find that when Ms. Webb was compelled to park at the access point it created a risk that set in motion an unbroken chain of events which resulted in her tripping on the roadway at the access point. Although the tripping on the roadway at the access point caused Mrs. Webb’s injuries, I find as a fact that this was ‘ancillary’ to her being compelled to disembark at the access point.”
On that basis, the outcome was explicit:
“Ms. Webb was injured as a result of an ‘accident’ as defined in section 2(1) of the Schedule.”
By contrast, the more recent and more factually analogous Ontario decision is Racey v The Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2022 CanLII 2764. There, the Tribunal described the scenario as follows:
“The applicant parked her vehicle in the driveway of her child’s daycare facility, turned her vehicle off, left the keys in the ignition and got out of the vehicle with the intention of walking behind the vehicle to reach the rear passenger door and helping her child get out of his seat so he could enter the daycare. While walking around the rear of the vehicle, the applicant slipped on the icy driveway, fell and was injured.”
The Tribunal rejected automobile causation. At para 26, it held:
“I find that the applicant’s injuries were not a consequence directly caused by the use or operation of the automobile but were caused by a later intervening cause, specifically that she slipped on ice on the ground.”
That conclusion was reinforced at paras 27 and 28:
“The ice on the ground and the applicant’s slip and fall constitute an independent intervening event that broke the chain of events…”
“I find that the use or operation of the automobile was not the dominant feature of the applicant’s injuries.”
These cases demonstrate that Ontario law itself turns heavily on how the risk is characterized—ongoing disembarkation in Webb, versus a discrete ground hazard in Racey. They do not establish a broad new rule that injuries occurring after exit are presumptively vehicle-related.
Saskatchewan Authority Aligns More Closely with Racey
Saskatchewan jurisprudence aligns far more closely with Racey than with Webb. In Herbert v Auto Connection, 2017 SKQB 110, the Court addressed a fall that occurred after the claimant exited his vehicle in a parking area. The facts were described at paras 2 and 27:
On exiting his vehicle some distance from the front door of the business, Mr. Herbert took a few steps… fell and broke his right femur neck.
Mr. Herbert encountered the icy patch left from the tow truck exhaust the day before, lost his footing, and fell.
The Court focused squarely on the operative cause of the injury, holding at para 157:
“The icy patch made a causal difference to the injury; there would be no hip injury but for the icy patch.”
That reasoning mirrors both Racey and Umpherville. The vehicle was part of the backdrop, not the cause. This continuity in Saskatchewan authority explains why Webb is likely to remain fact-specific rather than transformative in this province.
Cannito’s Limited Relevance
Cannito v Madison Properties Inc, 2018 ONSC 6190, does not materially alter the Saskatchewan analysis. It was an occupiers’ liability case arising from a parking lot fall, not a vehicle-use case. Its relevance lies in evidentiary principles rather than automobile causation. As the Court held at paras 31 and 36:
“An inference of causation must be based on objective facts rather than conjecture or speculation.”
“Speculative theories are insufficient to establish liability.”
While those principles may be cited in Saskatchewan on issues of proof, they do not expand the role of Ontario authority in determining whether a motor vehicle caused an injury.
Conclusion
Recent Ontario slip-and-exit decisions do not materially change the Saskatchewan analysis. Saskatchewan’s law now provides a clear appellate framework requiring a causal relationship that is “more than merely incidental or fortuitous.” Where the vehicle is only the situs of an injury and a ground hazard is the true source of harm, Umpherville and Herbert leave little room for Ontario cases to drive the outcome. Ontario authorities may assist by illustration, but they do not displace Saskatchewan law. In practical terms, they remain persuasive at most—never determinative—of the result here.
*The law may have changed since this article was first published. You should consult with your lawyer to confirm the current state of the law*
For further information please contact:
| Denim R. Martyn Direct Line: (306) 477-7261 Email: dmartyn@cuelenaere.com |